Abstract: This paper discusses state formation among the Xiongnu from a comparative perspective, arguing that it is legitimate to refer to their polity as an 'empire.' It also explores the applicability of a new theory that seeks to explain large-scale imperiogenesis with reference to structural tensions between steppe nomads and agriculturalists.
The Xiongnu, states, and empires
The comparative study of empires has been flourishing in recent years.
1 What place door should -'Xiongnu Studies' occupy in this discourse? The opening question is whether the Xiongnu formed what can legitimately be called an 'empire'. This may seem a pointless question: a 'western' term originally derived from the Roman 'imperium', 'empire' is being invoked in a wide variety of circumstances and very generously applied, for instance to the United States or the current 'late capitalist' world-system. 2 If almost anything can now be an 'empire', surely so can be the Xiongnu. Nonetheless, definitions are of value, if only to establish common ground for scholarly debate.
Formally, empires are axiomatically regarded as a form of the state. 3 This immediately raises two questions, whether the Xiongnu built a state and whether it qualifies as an empire. 4 The Xiongnu hardly met the classic Weberian definition of the state due to their rulers' lack of a credible claim to a "monopoly of legitimate physical coercion in the implementation of its order", exercised by an administrative staff. 5 Any notion of "a monopoly on binding and permanent rule-making" (Mann 1986, 37) seems likewise out of place. The existence of a spatially concentrated set of institutions and personnel "exerting authority over a territorially distinct area" (Haldon 1993, 32-33) is similarly doubtful, notwithstanding the Xiongnu's supposed demarcation of boundaries with the Han state (Hanshu 94B p.3810 in Yü 1986, 398) . Other definitions likewise require qualification, such as Robert Carneiro's vision of the state as "an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities within its territory and having a centralized government with the power to draft men for war or work, levy and collect taxes, and decree and enforce laws" (Carneiro 1970, 733) . Neither tax collection nor governmental law enforcement were characteristics of steppe polities.
Of these two features, the absence of sanctions mediated by legal organs and legitimated force may appear to be the critical factor. By contrast, revenue collection, although commonly enmeshed with practices of coercion that facilitate and are themselves sustained by taxation, did not have to be internal to a given polity in order to support coercive capacities. In the case of steppe polities, it is striking that even outside revenue did not necessarily enable effective coercion. Steppe formations are usually seen as consensual and thus dependent on performance, primarily on their ability to obtain and allocate external resources. As a corollary of this consensual nature, they were prone to fission.
Minimalist observers might therefore be tempted to define the Xiongnu polity as a form of hegemony, a condition where a dominant power merely controlled the foreign but not the domestic policy of its associate entities (Doyle 1986, 40 6 While one might also label the Xiongnu polity a confederacy (e.g. Yü 1986, 384) endowed with centralized offices, this would merely shift the question to the problem of whether confederacies also function as states, which may or may not be the case depending on circumstances.
Alternatively, the Xiongnu formations may be likened to chiefdoms, defined as "sociopolitical organizations with a centralized government, hereditary hierarchical status arrangements with an aristocratic ethos but no formal, legal apparatus of forceful repression, and without the capacity to prevent fission" (Claessen/Skalník 1978, 22) . From this perspective, Nikolay Kradin has called large steppe polities 'supercomplex chiefdoms' (Kradin 2002, 372) . However, as Claudio Cioffi-Revilla's comparison with shorter-lived later formations shows, fission does not seem to have been a serious issue for the Xiongnu (see Chapter *). Given the spatial extension of their polity, a split in two (in the 50s BCE and 40s CE) hardly counts as significant fragmentation. Otherwise, the archetypal empire, the Roman Empire, would also have to face questions about its statehood: after all, it split into two or more parts on a number of occasions between 193 and 395 CE and was continuously partitioned from then until the demise of its western half in 476/480 CE. We might also want to reconsider the notions of lacking internal revenue sources and lack of rule enforcement. In some sense the assumption that the Xiongnu polity did not command internal revenue is both untrue and irrelevant. Even if we were to exclude from the equation revenue from non-nomadic areas under their control, as in Xinjiang, the steppe population itself provided labor services in the form of military service. If we count the provision of military labor as a form of resource extraction, the contribution of the steppe population was very considerable. Under the right circumstances this did not require great efforts on the part of rulers: labor extraction could readily be managed at the local level, and the decimal system of military organization attributed to the Xiongnu (and found in later steppe formations) points to some degree of centralized coordination even under conditions of weak state penetration (Di Cosmo 2002, 177) . Moreover, reliance on the extraction of resources other than military labor from outside the sphere of a polity's core population was not unique to steppe formations: other historical states likewise relied on external revenues or a mixture of plunder, external tribute, and domain incomes. Once again the experience of ancient Rome provides a useful example. During the Republican regime prior to extra-Italian conquests (very roughly from 500 to 250 BCE), members of the in-group (i.e., Roman citizens) primarily contributed military labor to state efforts. Material revenue accrued mostly in the form of war plunder, a source of income that only if necessary was supplemented by a low annual tax that could be assessed to reward soldiers when booty was insufficient to cover outlays. Once external provinces had been established and the scale of plunder and extortion increased, even that small financial contribution was abolished and for more than a century thereafter external tribute and plunder were the main means of sustaining collective action in the form of military service by citizens. It was only in later stages of Roman state formation that formal fiscal institutions were established in the citizen core. Yet there is 6 It is not clear what this passage shows other than a system of military leadership; cf. the discussion by Barfield 1981, 48-49. 7 Here and in the remainder of the chapter I use the Roman Empire as a comparandum for both Xiongnu and China. I do so because Roman history provides suitable and often unexpected illustrations, and in order to highlight the utility of a global perspective in the study of imperial formations. 8 Blanton/Fargher 2008, 112-132; Monson and Scheidel forthcoming; and cf. already Kradin/Srynnikova 2006. nothing to suggest that this reliance on external revenue made the Roman republic of citizens any less of a state.
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As for lack of rule enforcement, Xiongnu rulers had the option to attack disobedient subjects, even if this may often not have been feasible in practice. As before, the case of ancient Rome illustrates this principle. For a long time, the Roman Republic was made up of farmerwarriors. Privately armed and scattered across numerous local communities, they were not readily susceptible to state coercion for the simple reason that their militias and the military resources of the state were one and the same. As a consequence, bargaining and consensus were critical preconditions for mobilizing collective action, which occurred primarily -and for many citizens, exclusively -in military contexts.
Xiongnu arrangements, which were intrinsically similar, only seem unusual by the standards of early Chinese state formation in the Warring States and Qin-Han periods, a process that was itself unusual by pre-modern world historical standards with respect to the precocious bureaucratization and centralization it entailed. The instrumentalization of that system to serve as a counterpoint to nearby steppe polities necessarily creates an inflated impression of the differences between basic state dynamics in sedentary and nomadic environments. A broader comparative historical perspective that accounts for the true breadth of state types reduces this apparently stark contrast.
10 Such comparisons are not meant to efface the differences between ecological contexts: a steppe environment constrains state formation much more narrowly than other environments which consequently experience greater variability in outcomes. At the same time, it would surely be unwise to link certain state properties exclusively to a steppe environment: in some instances, very different ecological preconditions can produce analogous institutional features.
State capabilities are a matter of degree, and low levels of capabilities do not by themselves preclude statehood. The Xiongnu polity may thus have approximated the ideal type of the 'inchoate state', the first phase of the three-stage model of the 'early state' developed by Henri Claessen and Peter Skalník, in which kinship and community ties still dominated relations in political field; specialists were rare; taxation was primitive or ad hoc; close contacts and reciprocity existed between rulers and ruled (Claessen/Skalník 1978: 22-23). Then again, whether there are any meaningful differences between this type of polity and a chiefdom is open to debate (Kradin 2008, 113) . Overall, we are dealing with a case where the definitional fields of hegemony, confederacy, chiefdom, and inchoate early state are difficult or perhaps impossible to disentangle.
In as much as the Xiongnu polity was or resembled a state, was it an empire? Sheer size, though ostensibly relevant, is not a crucial variable. Instead, modern studies tend to emphasize structural features. One of them is the unequal relationship between a ruling center (or core, or metropole) and a ruled or dominated periphery (or rather peripheries).
11 This hierarchical quality is logically and genetically associated with heterogeneity: empires are often multi-ethnic and multi-lingual, with diverse communities linked to a central power via varied local elites (Howe 2002, 30; Goldstone/Haldon 2009, 17-19) . Some stress the fractured nature of imperial peripheries which are connected to the center by means of a spoke-like structure that creates a 9 Unless, that is, we embrace extreme Eurocentric definitions of the state that are still popular among political scientists and deny statehood to all or most polities prior to 1300: e.g., Poggi 1990, 23; 25; Van Creveld 1999, 1. 10 Whether state formation required concurrent structural differentiation to 'count' is another question. Kradin 2002, 370 argues that large steppe polities were the result of scaling-up from clan and tribal formations to chiefdoms and larger 'imperial' entities that added more people and new layers of hierarchy but did not actuate structural differentiation. But the latter is not a standard element of definitions of the state. Moreover, the conventional conceptualization of nomadic societies in terms of clans and tribes has been called into question: Sneath 2007. 11 E.g., Doyle 1986, 30; 45; Finer 1997, 8; Reynolds 2006, 152. 'rimless wheel': peripheral communities are severally tied to the center without merging into a unified periphery. This arrangement allows the imperial core to exert dominance (Motyl 2001, 4) . These attempts to define the 'essence of empire' invite qualifications. If we apply the concepts of asymmetric core-periphery relations, heterogeneity and peripheral fragmentation, we find that many or perhaps most states larger than city-states started out as empires, including the eventual 'nation states' of Europe. Do polities that are structured around imperial centers and subject peripheries remain empires as these distinctions erode over time, as for instance in the late Roman Empire or under later Chinese dynasties? If not, 'empire' might best be defined as a developmental stage in state formation, a phase that may either end in disintegration or instead lead to ongoing consolidation into more cohesive and homogeneous states.
Distinctions that are sometimes drawn between different types of empires take account of developmental aspects. Thus, Michael Mann distinguishes between empires of domination and more mature territorial empires (Mann 1986, 130-133) . Shmuel Eisenstadt's distinction between patrimonial and bureaucratic empires, albeit not quite the same, points in the same direction (Eisenstadt 1993). In both cases, the degree of penetration of imperial peripheries by the center is regarded as the key criterion: whether the center restricts itself -or is restricted -to the domination of diverse components via tribute-taking and the provision of protection without seeking to re-organize existing structures and institutions, or whether it is more intrusive, replacing local allies with salaried agents and striving to impose specific laws, beliefs, and so on.
An 'inchoate state' (or 'supercomplex chiefdom', or whatever term we prefer to apply to extensive steppe polities) necessarily lacked the capacity to penetrate and re-organize local communities. If the Xiongnu created an empire, it therefore had to be of the low-maintenance variety, an empire of domination. Yet empires of domination are particularly accepting of great differences between center and periphery. A socially fractured and consensus-based ruling polity may dominate a periphery as long as it was sufficiently cohesive to generate the necessary means of organized violence. In so far as the Xiongnu dominated populations in different environments, such as oases, they were undoubtedly engaged in the business of empire.
In the final analysis, it may well be easier for us to establish the imperial nature of the Xiongnu than any putatively normative features of statehood. This observation serves to qualify the initial axiom that all empires are states. It was certainly possible for polities whose claims to statehood remain a subject of debate to maintain imperial relations -that is, asymmetric relations of violent domination and non-reciprocal resource extraction -with other groups, groups that would be tied to the ruler and his senior confederates via the spokes of a rimless wheel as in Motyl's felicitous image of empire. All this justifies the common practice of referring to a 'Xiongnu empire'.
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From 'shadow empires' to co-evolutionary imperiogenesis?
Modern observers have long maintained that nomadic populations benefited from predation on agrarian societies. These benefits could be obtained through conquest (Khazanov 1994) but also through state formation in the steppe regions. 13 The latter could result in what Thomas Barfield has called "shadow empires," extensive polities that 'shadowed' agrarian empires in the sense that "they came into existence as a response to imperial state formation that was initiated some place else" (Barfield 2001, 33) . Steppe empires are prime examples of this 12 E.g., Yü 1986, 387; Barfield 1992, 32; Barfield 2001, 34; Di Cosmo 2002, 162; Kradin 2002b; Lewis 2007, 134 . By the same token we hear about a 'Hun empire' under Attila (Kelly 2009, 267: 269) , perhaps with less justification. Kradin 2005, 165-166 argues that the Rouran khaganate was a mixture of chiefdom and state but nevertheless calls it an empire. 13 Barfield 1992; Golden 1992; Barfield 2001; Kradin 2002. type of polity because of the specific properties of steppe societies: surplus production was often very limited and the population was intrinsically mobile and difficult to rule. Under these circumstances, external stimuli for state formation were vital. The extraction of resources from adjacent sedentary societies sustained more complex forms of hierarchy and collective action in the steppe. Political power depended on the redistribution of external goods, and centralization occurred primarily in the sphere of foreign policy. The resultant formations were parasitical on sedentary societies.
14 From this perspective, the Xiongnu polity may be regarded as a response to the creation of the Qin and Han empires and the opportunity for large-scale resource extraction they presented. Given that the Qin and Han empires were larger and wealthier than any previous states in this part of the world, the analogous "shadow empire" in the steppe was likewise larger and more powerful than anything that had come before. This development was merely the earliest instance of a more common process of secondary state formation in the steppe that was later reprised by Xianbei, Rouran, Turkic, and Uighur polities (Barfield 1992, 12-14) .
Nicola di Cosmo has qualified this model by emphasizing productive capacity within the steppe and the creation of mixed economies that reduced structural demand for predation on agrarian societies (Di Cosmo 2002, 167-174) . In his view, crisis drove state formation in the steppe: crises could be ecological in nature or caused by the violent expansion of sedentary societies. The latter, he argues, accounted for imperiogenesis among the Xiongnu. The Qin occupation of the Ordos region in 215 BCE created pressures that impelled a measure of political centralization (Di Cosmo 2002, 174-188) .
As Mark Lewis has pointed out, the "predatory" and "defensive" models of Xiongnu state formation are not mutually exclusive: the second shows what initiated centralization and the first one explains how it could be sustained (Lewis 2007, 132) . I would even go so far as to say that the two models are essentially indistinguishable: without Chinese centralization the Xiongnu might not have been put under great pressure; without that pressure there might not have been a "shadow empire"; but without Chinese centralization there might not have been enough tribute to sustain a very large "steppe empire."
The concept of "shadow empire" makes perfect sense from a comparative perspective since it foregrounds conflict as the primary driver of state formation. Theories of state formation tend to fall into one of two categories, managerial or integrative theories on the one hand, according to which states develop in order to manage complexity, and conflict or stress theories on the other, according to which states arise from competition between and/or within groups and tend to maintain and reinforce inequality between and/or within polities. 15 Theories of the latter type have been richly substantiated with respect to European history and can readily be extended more globally. The Xiongnu case is a good example, supporting as it does Otto Hintze's classic premise that "all state organization was originally military organization, organization for war".
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Not only was Xiongnu centralization driven by external conflict, it also enabled hierarchies to emerge. Returning once again to our comparison with ancient Rome, the Roman Republic, outside its very limited original city-state core, was for a long time not much more than a military alliance system that created demand for offices providing military leadership (analogous to the 14 Kradin's characterization of this type of polity as 'xenocratic' (Kradin 2002 , 379, taken up by Turchin 2009 ) is misleading for two reasons: it literally means "ruled/dominated by foreigners" rather than "ruling over/dominating foreigners", and even if it were taken to mean the latter it would not accurately describe the relationship between the Xiongnu and the Han Empire. The need to coin exotic neologisms is obviated by the existence of a well-established term that accurately describes this relationship, namely 'parasitical'. Given its unfavorable connotations it is easy to see why we would hesitate to apply it to steppe polities, although Barfield 2001 , 34 does so. But that alone does not justify the label 'xenocratic'. 15 For surveys of the debate, see e.g. Claessen/Skalník 1978, 5-17; Cohen 1978; Sanderson 1999, 68-86; Scheidel 2011, section 2. 16 Hintze in Gilbert 1975, 181 . For warmaking as statemaking see especially Tilly 1985; 1992; Porter 1994. nomads' leaders of 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000) and could not readily have been sustained if warmaking and attendant predation had been allowed to abate, just as steppe formations would have faded in the absence of military collective action (cf. Eich/Eich 2005).
The "shadow empire" model tends to view state formation in the steppe as secondary. Barfield classifies steppe polities as "mirror empires", emphasizing the notion that they imitate institutional arrangements of agrarian empires (Barfield 2001, 29-35) . Not all "shadow empires" were "mirror empires" in the steppe: Barfield also references other types but the underlying principle of secondary development remains the same in all cases.
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This approach raises the question whether imperial formations in sedentary societies may not also have been influenced or driven by developments in the steppe. Peter Turchin has recently introduced a symbiotic theory of imperiogenesis that posits a feedback loop (Turchin 2009). In this scenario, scaling-up occurred concurrently on both sides of the ecological divide. Agriculturalists formed larger polities to defend themselves from and put pressure on herders, and herders scaled up in order to defend themselves and put pressure on agriculturalists. "The initial 'anisotropy' in military power on the farming-steppe frontier thus sets up an autocatalytic process, resulting in a runaway evolution of polity sizes on both sides of the frontier" (Turchin 2009, 197) .
Turchin's model pays relatively little attention to proximate mechanisms beyond noting three ways in which scaling-up could occur among agriculturalists: by forming defensive alliances; by conquest of peer polities that reducing free-riding; and by conquest by steppe groups (Turchin 2009, 196-197) . The model's focus is on ultimate causation. This focus is sustained by an analysis of 64 empires in world history up to 1800 that covered at least 1 million square kilometers. Almost all of them were located "in or next to the arid belt that runs through Afroeurasia, from the Sahara to the Gobi in the east" (Turchin 2009, 201-203) . The only noted exceptions were the Angkorian empire in South-East Asia, the Inca in the Andes, and the Roman and Carolingian empires in Europe. Turchin considers this strong statistical correlation a sign that the presence of steppe frontiers was highly conducive to the formation of large empires.
Our first question has to be: is this true? Possible objections are worth considering. Levels of socio-economic complexity are generally determined by geographical and ecological factors, and overall trajectories of regional development have been fundamentally shaped by these preconditions (Diamond 1999; Olsson/Hibbs 2005) . It just so happens that much of the world's 'prime real estate' that sustains higher levels of complexity and thus imperial state formation covers a temperate belt that is comprised of much of Europe and North Africa and the southern half of Asia. Although much of this belt also happens to border on steppe extensive regions, one could argue that empires were most likely to develop within this temperate zone regardless of its proximity to steppe frontiers. Moreover, the practice of classifying empires by size rather than population puts steppe formations that were spatially extensive but sparsely populated on the same footing as large sedentary empires with tens or hundreds of millions of inhabitants, which may not be justifiable.
These doubts can be addressed by noting that regions that whose ecology encouraged higher levels of complexity but did not directly border on steppes, such as much of Europe and southern India, were historically far less likely to become the cores of large (contiguous) empires.
As far as size is concerned, steppe empires may have been less populated but were also more difficult to hold together, making their emergence more rather than less difficult to explain.
Moreover, Turchin has developed a more generalized version of his model which allows for other kinds of divides to account for imperial state formation, known as meta-ethnic frontier theory (Turchin 2003, 50-93) . It predicts that the degree of difference between neighboring populations is positively correlated with the degree of scaling-up, even if no steppe frontiers are present. This approach helps account for the creation of the Roman Empire, which emerged at least in part through conflict with, and peer alliance-building against, the Gauls in northern Italy, and for the development of the Frankish polity in the post-Roman period, which occurred along a long-term political and cultural frontier (Miller 1993; Turchin 2003, 170-172) .
In addition, the narrower version of the model that is centered on the role of steppe frontiers helps explain outcomes that did not occur, such as the creation of polities comparable to the Roman Empire in post-Roman Europe. In comparative world historical terms, the absence of very large empire from the region that had previously been claimed by the Roman Empire is unusual: regions that once sustained large empires tended to do so time and again, for instance in the Middle East, northern India, and China. Although various explanations appear plausible (Scheidel 2009; in press) , insufficient proximity to the central Eurasian steppe may well have been a significant factor. As Kiev, Poland-Lithuania and Russia all developed into very large polities, in so doing they buffered the rest of Europe from the steppe and may thereby have helped post-Roman polycentrism endure.
Returning to the Xiongnu, Turchin's co-evolutionary model places their development in the context of broader dynamics as we move from assessing the impact of sedentary societies on the steppe to the impact of the steppe on state formation in China. In view of the conventional emphasis on inter-state conflict in the Warring States period that led to the Qin-Han unification, is it reasonable to contend that scaling-up in China was not merely accompanied and influenced but to a significant degree driven by pressure from the steppe?
Early empires were often built by absorbing similar polities. Akkadians and Assyrians subdued other city-states; the Achaemenid Persians conquered the Lydian, Neo-Babylonian and Saite Egyptian empires; the Romans created an empire by first defeating other city-state alliances in Italy and North Africa and then the Hellenistic kingdoms in the eastern Mediterranean. The state of Qin defeated and absorbed the other Warring States; Liu Bang's coalition defeated the kingdom of Chu to set up the Han Empire, and in 154 BCE Han generals had to defeat seven feudatory kingdoms to preserve it. Does it make sense to interpret these and analogous developments as the consequence of proximity to the steppe and of the desire to prevent freeriding in collective action against herders?
If the question is put this way, a positive answer seems unlikely. It is, however, important to be precise about the logic of the model. It does not require conflict between agriculturalists and herders to be the main driving force behind large-scale state formation among the former. Rather, it requires tensions between them to be important enough to make large-scale state formation much more likely and common than in other environments: in other words, that this was, for most large empires, a necessary condition but not necessarily a sufficient one.
It is obviously difficult to determine empirically whether this assumption is correct. Relative timing is not particularly relevant. In the "mirror empire" model, crudely conceived, agrarian empire has to precede steppe empire, whereas in the co-evolutionary model, scaling-up unfolds in steps. In a sense, both is true in the case of early China. One the one hand, Xiongnu state formation expanded significantly around 210 BCE, in response to Qin power; one the other, "shanyu" leaders had existed for generations and Xiongnu coalitions had long been powerful enough to field large military forces (Di Cosmo 2002, 152-158) . Polities on both sides of the ecological divide grew more or less at the same time. That relationship, however, does not by itself demonstrate causal connections.
Consideration of space is more revealing. If the co-evolutionary model is valid, we would expect the centers of agrarian empires to be located close to the steppe frontier. This was clearly the case in China where, with the single exception of the Ming, all dynasties from Shang to Qing had developed in the north of the region.
18 World-wide, this correlation is not as clear-cut as in the case of China but nevertheless worth examining in greater detail (cf. Turchin 2009, 203-215) . At the very least, this logical corollary of the theory is susceptible to empirical testing.
More generally, the co-evolutionary model raises methodological and what one might call aesthetic issues. Suppose that it were possible to confirm a connection between the formation of large agrarian empires and proximity to steppe frontiers that was so strong that it could not reasonably be dismissed as coincidental. A global trend of this kind would put great pressure on historians of agrarian empires to identify proximate mechanisms that mediated this relationship. Yet for many historians, their ability (or inability) to identify credible proximate mechanisms may well matter more than the discovery of higher-order correlations and their logical implications. This is not merely a function of historians' common mantra that everything is somehow 'more complex' than we think, a particularistic attitude that is the bane of macro-historical analysis. Even historians who are prepared to accept the utility of globalizing theories would still see it as their primary responsibility to document rather than merely accept causal connections.
As noted above, Turchin considers defensive alliances among peer states and conquest of peer states to suppress free-riding as possible ways in which large agrarian empires might arise in response to challenges from the steppe. This perspective seems unnecessarily restrictive. Other scenarios are possible, such as the possibility that exposure to steppe populations enhanced the military skills of agrarian polities and thereby facilitated conquest and scaling-up. We must also allow for the possibility that in spite of the observed global correlation between imperiogenesis and steppe frontiers, some of these empires may have developed without significant input from the steppe. Testing any of these options is challenging but worthwhile.
Few if any historians would be inclined to argue that the Warring States formed a defensive alliance under Qin's leadership in order to pool resources against steppe nomads or that Qin subdued its rivals in order to discourage free-riding in the provision of protection to agriculturalists. For this reason alone, alternative explanations merit consideration. It may well be relevant that Qin experienced a great deal of conflict with unsettled populations and for a long time expanded primarily at their expense rather than in conflict with more similarly structured polities. Even so, the evidence does not suggest that steppe populations per se played a significant role in this process. Qin's expansion targeted neighbors who may not have been fully sedentary but were not nomads either. Another major contender for supremacy, the state of Chu, expanded in the south, far away from the Eurasian steppe. The state that was geographically most exposed to the steppe, Jin, suffered state deformation to the extent that infighting split it into three separate polities, Han, Zhao and Wei, which were never reunited. Further east, Yan, which was similarly exposed, never turned into a major player. It is likewise difficult to account for the fact that growing Xiongnu demands during the first seventy years of the Han dynasty did not precipitate state formation: pressure from the steppe may not have been significant enough, or the autonomy of the feudatory kingdoms may have imposed too strong a constraint. The latter view is supported by the fact that after the latter's suppression, the government of the Emperor Wu was able to increase state capabilities for the purpose of challenging the Xiongnu and resuming expansion on multiple fronts. Although one could argue that all these specifics do not matter much in terms of ultimate outcomes, they do serve to demonstrate the difficulties involved in identifying proximate mechanisms and processes of causation.
This should not prompt us to dismiss co-evolutionary theories of agrarian imperial state formation or consider them irrelevant. In view of the observed global trends in outcomes, the burden of proof rests on historians who wish to maintain that these theories do not apply to a given case, even if some of them are likely to resent this premise. Co-evolutionary theories redistribute agency from the settled cores (where it resides according to the "shadow"/"mirror empire" model) to the steppe peripheries. They also conceive of imperial state formation on both sides of the ecological divide as a truly symbiotic process. In that sense, to return to the topic of this volume, they may cast doubt on the legitimacy of studying "the Xiongnu" (or, for that matter, "the Han Empire") and encourage us instead to engage more explicitly in the study of very broadly defined ecological interaction zones.
